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INTRODUCTION 
On March 31, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky and created a Sixth Amendment duty for defense 
attorneys to warn defendants of the immigration consequences of a 
criminal conviction under the Sixth Amendment.1  This decision fol-
lowed decades of contrary precedent in which the majority of state 
and federal courts refused to create the duty under the Sixth 
Amendment in their jurisdictions.2  Padilla is one of the most im-
portant Supreme Court decisions in recent years.  It affords thou-
 
 1. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Gumangan v. United States, 254 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing 
with approval the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ conclusion that failure to advise a de-
fendant of the prospect of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel); Russo v. United States, No. 97-2891, 1999 WL 164951, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 
22, 1999) (“[C]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for the mere failure to inform a de-
fendant of the collateral consequences of a plea, such as deportation.”); United States 
v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that attorney’s failure to inform cli-
ent of possible deportation is not ineffective assistance of counsel; rather, defendant 
must show that there was a serious deficiency in counseling and that such deficiency 
is prejudicial); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7–8 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 
F.2d 764, 769 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ga. 1999) 
(holding that a guilty plea will not be set aside because a defendant was not advised 
of possible collateral consequences of the plea); State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145, 1152 
(Kan. 2002) (“We conclude that here the failure to advise [defendant] of the deporta-
tion consequences does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his 
plea manifestly unjust.”); Commonwealth. v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 
2005) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to advise defendant of potential depor-
tation consequences of his guilty plea was not cognizable as a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel).  For a more detailed list of cases on the subject, see Yolanda 
Vázquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions:  The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, the 
Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 31, 33 n.10, 35 n.17 
(2010) [hereinafter Vázquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants]. 
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sands of noncitizen immigrants a right that may protect their ability to 
remain in this country.3 
While Padilla affirmatively answered the broad question of wheth-
er a duty exists under the Sixth Amendment to advise a defendant of 
the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, it also left 
many questions unanswered.  One critical inquiry is the extent of the 
advice required by the Sixth Amendment under Padilla.  The majori-
ty held that “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a 
risk of deportation.”4  In addition, the court determined that when 
immigration law is “succinct, clear, and explicit,” defense counsel is 
required to give his or her client correct advice regarding the immi-
gration consequences of a criminal conviction.5  However, if immigra-
tion law is not “succinct and straightforward,” defense counsel is only 
required to give general advice that the plea may have adverse effects 
on his/her immigration status.6  The two-tiered advice system created 
by Padilla has three troubling effects.  First, it creates considerable 
uncertainty as to what constitutes sufficient advice under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Second, the level of information that must be provided 
by defense counsel to her client to satisfy the Sixth Amendment is 
based on immigration law and its perceived complexities instead of on 
the client’s goals.  Third, the ability for defense counsel to negotiate a 
favorable plea that could prevent removal is not guaranteed to all 
noncitizen defendants. 
This Article discusses the potential detrimental impact of Padilla’s 
ambiguous holding and the creation of a two-tiered admonishment 
system on a defendant’s ability to remain in the United States, as well 
as the confusion it causes for defense counsel and the court.  Part I 
discusses the historical posture of a defendant’s right to advice on the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Part II discusses the holding in Padilla, highlighting 
some of the key points that the case left unanswered and explores its 
potential failure to achieve the goal of assisting noncitizen defendants 
in preventing their removal from the United States.  Part III suggests 
ways to ensure that all noncitizen defendants are given adequate 
counsel on the immigration consequences of criminal conviction.  
 
 3. See Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right 
to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 34 CHAMPION 18, 18 
(2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=14611 (describing Padilla 
as causing a “major upheaval” and surprising even those following the case). 
 4. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
 5. See id. at 1483. 
 6. See id. 
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This Article concludes that, although the Padilla decision was an in-
cremental and positive step toward reform in criminal representation, 
legislative action, increased implementation and enforcement of pro-
fessional standards, reassessment of educational training, and future 
litigation will be necessary before all defense counsel will begin to ad-
vise clients consistently of the specific immigration consequences of a 
conviction and to assist in potential plea negotiations to prevent de-
portation of each of their noncitizen clients.  If lawyers fail to build on 
its promise, Padilla will not be the landmark decision it could be. 
I.  HOW PADILLA “CHANGED” THE SIXTH AMENDMENT DUTY 
OWED TO NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS 
The United States Constitution and Gideon v. Wainwright estab-
lished the right to counsel in criminal trials.7  The Supreme Court rec-
ognized that counsel during a criminal court proceeding was neces-
sary to ensure the “fundamental human rights of life and liberty.”8  
The “right of counsel” has been interpreted to guarantee the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel,9 requiring assistance of counsel to 
be “within the range of a competence demanded of attorneys in crim-
inal cases.”10 
Following from this right to effective assistance of counsel, a de-
fendant may challenge a conviction or plea bargain by putting forth a 
Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  When 
deciding whether defense counsel has violated a client’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, courts use the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Strickland test.11  To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim under Strickland, the defendant must prove: (1) that his coun-
sel’s performance was deficient; and, (2) that the deficiency in his 
counsel’s performance prejudiced his defense.12  Plainly speaking, un-
 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
counsel is a fundamental right and is made obligatory to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 8. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 467 (1938) (holding that compliance with 
the Sixth Amendment’s mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal 
court’s authority to deprive an accused of life or liberty); accord Grosjean v. Am. 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936) (holding that “the fundamental right of the 
accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution” is “safeguarded against state 
action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 9. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 10. Id. at 771. 
 11. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 721 (1984). 
 12. See id. at 687. 
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der Strickland, counsel’s representation must fall “below an objective 
standard of reasonableness” and there must be “a reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”13 
The U.S. Supreme Court extended the Strickland test to encom-
pass guilty pleas.  In Lockhart v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that 
Strickland’s two-prong test applied to challenges of guilty pleas based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel claims.14  While the analysis for 
the first prong of Strickland remains the same for guilty pleas, the se-
cond prong, the “prejudice prong,” is satisfied if the defendant shows 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.15 
Although the right to effective assistance of counsel was estab-
lished under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments many years 
ago,16 the scope of the advice that counsel is obligated to give clients 
continues to evolve.17 
A. Immigration Consequences and the Sixth Amendment Pre-
Padilla 
Prior to March 31, 2010, lower federal and state courts were divid-
ed over whether effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment required a lawyer to advise his client of the immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction.  Most adopted and applied the 
 
 13. Id. at 688, 694. 
 14. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
 15. See id. at 58–59. 
 16. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (declaring that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies equally in state courts by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding the Con-
stitution requires states to provide defendants charged with capital crimes a fair op-
portunity to secure counsel when state law has already conceded the right to coun-
sel). 
 17. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:  From 
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (discussing 
evolution of the right to counsel through Sixth Amendment case law); Josh Bowers, 
Fundamental Fairness & the Path from Santobello to Padilla:  A Response to Profes-
sor Bibas, CALIF. L. REV. (2011) (discussing right to counsel through Fourteenth 
Amendment case law); John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All 
Over Again”:  Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Par-
tial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (2007) (discussing Sixth Amendment case law returning to a 
guidelines approach that was seen prior to Strickland). 
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“collateral consequences doctrine”18 and the Court’s classification of 
immigration law.  The Court held in Brady v. United States that un-
der the Fifth Amendment, courts were only responsible for admon-
ishing the defendant on the “direct” consequences and not the “indi-
rect” or “collateral” consequences of a plea.19  The Court held in 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States that deportation was not considered a 
criminal punishment but rather a civil penalty.20  While these cases 
were never analyzed by the Supreme Court under the Sixth Amend-
ment, state and federal jurisdictions incorporated these holdings into 
their Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.21  As a result, the majority of 
jurisdictions refused to impose a duty on defense counsel to advise as 
to immigration consequences under the Sixth Amendment because 
immigration was deemed a “collateral” matter.22 
Since the majority of state and lower federal courts determined 
that defense counsel had no duty to advise on immigration issues, 
criminal defendants were typically prevented from arguing that coun-
sel’s failure to give such advice violated their Sixth Amendment 
right.23  More specifically, noncitizen defendants were unable to pre-
vail on ineffective assistance of counsel claims because failure to ad-
vise as to immigration consequences could not satisfy Strickland’s 
first prong, which required a showing of “unreasonable” or “defi-
cient” assistance.24 
In the ensuing years, immigration law and its enforcement became 
increasingly intertwined with the criminal justice system and the rami-
fications of the collateral consequence doctrine became clear:  the 
number of criminal charges that resulted in immigration consequenc-
es increased, immigration relief available for those who were convict-
ed of a crime decreased, and immigration enforcement targeting 
 
 18. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 704–09 (2002) 
(discussing history of the collateral consequence doctrine). 
 19. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
 20. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (stating that de-
portation was not punishment for a crime). 
 21. For a discussion of cases in which immigration consequences were found to be 
“collateral” rather than direct, see supra note 2 and accompanying text. See, e.g., 
United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) (characterizing deportation as 
a “harsh collateral consequence”); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (characterizing deportation as a “harsh collateral consequence”); 
United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 336–37 (7th Cir. 1989) (characterizing depor-
tation as a “harsh collateral consequence”).  
 22. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Vázquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants, supra note 2, at 33 n.10. 
 24. See id. 
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those with criminal convictions increased.25  As a result, some states 
and federal courts began to break from the traditional mantra that 
failure to advise as to the immigration consequences of a conviction 
could not be found to violate the Sixth Amendment.26  Prior to Pa-
dilla, jurisdictions across the country were divided on whether the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction should be exclud-
ed from the Sixth Amendment analysis to determine whether or not 
counsel was ineffective in failing to provide such advice.27 
B. The Padilla Decision 
On March 31, 2010, everything changed.  The Supreme Court is-
sued an opinion in Padilla that shocked many, gave noncitizen de-
fendants new hope, and left the courts and defense counsel wonder-
ing how they would implement this new duty.28  The Court, in a sev-
seven-to-two decision, declared that defense attorneys do have a 
Sixth Amendment duty to advise their clients of the immigration con-
sequences of a criminal conviction.29  The Court stated that “counsel 
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deporta-
tion.”30 
The Court refused to incorporate the long-held belief of state and 
lower federal courts that because immigration consequences were 
“collateral” in nature, defense counsel had no duty to advise on such 
information.31  The Court stated emphatically, “We, however, have 
 
 25. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1182(c) 
(2006)); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat 3009-546, 3009-597 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1229 (2006)). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d. 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that misadvice can be found to be ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004); People v. Pozo, 746 
P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987) (holding that failure to investigate potential deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if the attor-
ney had sufficient information to form a reasonable belief that client was an alien). 
 27. Compare Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805 (N.M. 2004), with United States v. Sambro, 
454 F.2d 918, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding that since immigration consequences 
are collateral, even misadvice cannot, as a matter of law, invalidate a guilty plea). 
 28. See McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”:  The Seismic Evolu-
tion of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 
HOW. L. J. 795, 796 (2010) (describing Padilla’s holding as “shocking commentators 
and practitioners alike”). 
 29. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 30. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
 31. See id. at 1482. 
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never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequenc-
es, to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional as-
sistance’ required under Strickland.”32  The Justices instead acknowl-
edged that deportation was a consequence “enmeshed” in the 
criminal process and held that the collateral consequence doctrine 
could not be applied.33  Advice regarding deportation consequences 
was protected from being “categorically removed from the ambit of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Strickland applies to Padilla’s 
claim.”34 
C. Understanding the Importance of Padilla 
Over the last approximately twenty-five years, the intersection be-
tween immigration and criminal law has grown and the connection 
has become more noticeable publically.35  Three reasons can be given 
for this increase: (1) the number of criminal charges that qualify as a 
removable offense has risen over the years; (2) the number of reme-
dies for relief from removal has decreased; and (3) there has been in-
creased enforcement of removal for noncitizens convicted of a 
crime.36 
As a result, the number of noncitizens removed from this country 
because of a criminal conviction has increased astronomically.  For 
instance, in 1986, the United States removed 1978 noncitizens based 
on their criminal and narcotics violations, accounting for approxi-
mately three percent of total removals.37  In 1996, just ten years later, 
the number of individuals removed from the United States had in-
creased to 69,680, 36,909 of whom were removed based on criminal 
and narcotics violations.  These individuals accounted for 53.8% of 
 
 32. Id. at 1481. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 1482.  
 35. See Danny Hakim & Nina Bernstein, New Paterson Policy May Reduce De-
portations, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/ 
nyregion/04deport.html?pagewanted=print. 
 36. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–80; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 469, 471–72 (2007); Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigra-
tion Consequences of Criminal Convictions, supra note 2 at, 37–46. 
 37. See MARY DOUGHERTY, DENISE WILSON & AMY WU, U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATISTICS, ANN. REP.:  IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT AC-
TIONS: 2004 6 (2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/pub 
lications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf. 
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the total number of individuals removed that year.38  In 2010, the De-
partment of Homeland Security removed approximately 387,242 
noncitizens, 168,532 of whom were removed because of a criminal 
conviction, accounting for 43.5% of the total number of removals.39  
Between 1996 and 2010, more than one million individuals were re-
moved due to criminal violations.40 
And the number of noncitizens who will be removed as a result of 
committing a crime will only increase.  This year the Obama Admin-
istration stated that it plans to remove approximately 400,000 nonciti-
zens from the country, focusing on noncitizens who have committed 
crimes.41 
As Justice Stevens so incisively noted, removal affects not only the 
individual removed, but also the family left behind.42  It is estimated 
that nearly ten percent of families with children in the United States 
 
 38. See U.S. DEPT’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATISTICS, 1996 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 171 (1996). 
 39. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010 
ANNUAL REPORT  4, tbls. 2, 4 (June 2011) [hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010. 
pdf. 
 40. See House Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Deportees to Latin American 
and Caribbean Countries, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1802 (2007) [hereinafter Hear-
ing on Deportees] (citing Representative Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere, at a July 24, 2007 hearing); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 4, tbl. 4 (July 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_08. 
pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2009 4, tbl. 4 
(Aug. 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ 
enforcement_ar_2009.pdf; 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 4, tbl. 4. 
 41. See Maria Hinojosa, The White House on Secure Communities and Deporta-
tions, LATINOUSA WITH MARIA HINOJOSA (Aug. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.latinousa.org/960-2/ (play the interview with Luis Miranda, Director of 
Hispanic Media at the White House, where he discusses the targeted removal of ap-
proximately 400,000 noncitizens, prioritizing “criminal aliens”); Celia Muñoz, Immi-
gration Update:  Maximizing Public Safety and Better Focusing Resources, THE 
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizing-public-safety-and-better-focusing-
resources (stating that they will focus on removing those noncitizens who have been 
convicted of crimes). 
 42. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).  For a further discussion 
of the impact of immigration consequences of a criminal conviction on individuals, 
families, and their communities, see Bryan Lonegan,  American Diaspora: The De-
portation of Lawful Residents from the United States and the Destruction of Their 
Families, 32 N.Y.U. REV. OF  L. & SOC. CHANGE 55, 70–76 (2007); Yolanda Vázquez, 
of Latinos:  A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into 
the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L J. 639, 665–75 (2011) [hereinafter Vázquez, 
Perpetuating the Marginalization]. 
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live in a “mixed status” household.43  A mixed status household is a 
family that has both citizen and noncitizen members.44  It is estimated 
that 1.6 million families in the United States were separated between 
1997 and 2007.45  Also, between 1998 and 2007, more than 100,000 
parents of United States citizen children were removed.46  These 
mixed status families face the breakup of the family nucleus and must 
confront issues of separation, poverty, and health,47 and the commu-
nities in which they live must deal with the ramifications of the loss of 
members of their community, leading to financial and economic dev-
astation.48 
In the criminal justice system, over eighty percent of individuals 
prosecuted are poor.49  Of those convicted, nearly ninety-five percent 
plead guilty.50  Therefore, the individuals most affected by removal 
resulting from a criminal conviction are poor noncitizens, their fami-
lies, and their communities. 
Taking this all together, it is strikingly apparent that: (1) the only 
way to avoid a deportation order based upon a criminal conviction is 
during the criminal court proceeding; (2) the majority of noncitizen 
defendants will be too poor to afford an immigration attorney to as-
sist them in maneuvering through the criminal justice system; (3) the 
majority of noncitizen defendants will not have the education to navi-
gate through the potential immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction without assistance; and (3) the majority of noncitizens will 
plead guilty in the criminal court system.   
 
 43. See Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, All Under One Roof:  Mixed-Status 
Families in an Era of Reform, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 397, 397 (2001). 
 44. See id.  
 45. See Human Rights Watch, Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants 
Harmed by United States Deportation Policy, at 44 (July 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46a764862.html. 
 46. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, RE-
MOVAL INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN 
5 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-15_Jan09.pdf. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization, supra note 42, at 665–74. 
 49. See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OF-
FICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 
(1996), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf.  
 50. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (quoting DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
2003 418, tbl. 5.17 (31st ed. 2005)) (“[O]nly approximately 5%, or 8,612 out of 68,533, 
of federal criminal prosecutions go to trial; [SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 2003 at 450, tbl 5.46] (only approximately 5% of all state felony criminal 
prosecutions go to trial).”). 
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Therefore, a noncitizen defendant’s only potential salvation will 
typically depend on whether his court appointed attorney or public 
defender has the ability and knowledge necessary to negotiate a plea 
bargain during the criminal proceedings that will result in a disposi-
tion that will prevent the noncitizen defendant from being deported.  
This demands that defense counsel not only give accurate advice, but 
also possess sufficient knowledge of immigration law to understand 
how to prevent a client’s removal from the United States.  The ques-
tion then remains, does Padilla provide for this?  If not, what will? 
II.  PADILLA’S UNFINISHED WORK 
With many court dockets and attorney caseloads at crushing levels, 
the system’s primary goal has been to get through cases as quickly 
and efficiently as possible, regardless of whether a defendant knows 
what his or her options are and how different outcomes might affect 
his or her life.51 
This reality was seen throughout pre-Padilla Sixth Amendment 
case law.  Although Strickland created a standard under which feder-
al and state courts could objectively assess Sixth Amendment cases, it 
also made it impossible to win an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.52  The two-prong test seemed to be too difficult to maneuver 
and most defendants could not overcome its strict and narrow view.53  
Counsel was allowed to disappear, be legally intoxicated, on drugs, 
and have no prior experience in criminal defense when trying a death 
 
 51. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical:  Defense Counsel and Col-
lateral consequences at Guilty Pleas, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 678–81 (2011) (discussing the 
reality of advising on collateral consequences due to crushing caseloads and under-
funding of public defender offices); Smyth, supra note 28, at 806–07 (discussing at-
torneys’ difficulties balancing “case outcomes” and “life outcomes”); Ronald F. 
Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1515, 1530–34 (2011) (discussing ways in which defense organizations and smaller 
practices are developing various methods for delivering adequate representation to 
their clients). 
 52. See David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright & Strickland v. Washington, in CRIM. 
PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 126 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (stating that from 1984 un-
til 2000, the Court had not found a single ineffective assistance of counsel case under 
Strickland’s analysis). 
 53. Cf. Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense At-
torneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002) (stating that 
because of Strickland’s two-prong test, “it is exceedingly difficult for a petitioner to 
prove that he received constitutionally inept representation”). 
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penalty case.54  For fifteen years after Strickland, the Court was una-
ble to find one Sixth Amendment violation for ineffective assistance 
of counsel.55  Instead of creating a standard by which “tactical” deci-
sions and unchecked representation would assist in defending clients 
zealously, defense counsel learned Strickland asked for nothing; de-
fendants’ rights were not the priority.56 
However, in 2000, the Court brought life back into the Sixth 
Amendment by focusing on attorneys’ work under professional 
norms rather than on the finality or accuracy of the criminal convic-
tion.57  The Court’s use of professional guides and standards to de-
termine a violation of the first prong of Strickland appeared in re-
sponse to ineffective assistance claims in death penalty cases.58  
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and Rompilla v. Beard all held 
that counsel was ineffective when failing to investigate possible miti-
gation for sentencing purposes as well as failing to investigate docu-
ments that the prosecution would be using against the defendant.59 
While Rompilla’s dissent particularly focused on Strickland’s view 
that professional norms and standards were only to be used as guides 
in a Sixth Amendment determination, the majority rejected such a 
formalistic and inflexible attitude.60  The dissent laid out particular is-
sues that historically prevented a defendant from winning a Sixth 
Amendment case under Strickland.  First, the dissent noted the ever-
present reality that in Sixth Amendment analysis, the Court has “con-
sistently declined to impose mechanical rules on counsel—even when 
 
 54. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional 
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 
75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–60 (1996). 
 55. See Cole, supra note 52, at 126. 
 56. See id. at 115 (“Courts frequently excuse atrocious lawyering as a ‘tactical’ de-
cision, subject to deference under the Court’s directive in Strickland.  But as Strick-
land itself illustrated, almost any deficiency in performance can in hindsight be de-
scribed as ‘strategic.’”). 
 57. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 17, at 142–47. 
 58. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380–81 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 523 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394–95 (2000). See generally 
Blume & Neumann, supra note 17.  
 59. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Williams, 529 U.S. at 
396.  See generally Blume & Neumann, supra note 17. 
 60. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 400 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile we 
have referred to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as a useful point of refer-
ence, we have been careful to say these standards ‘are only guides’ and do not estab-
lish the constitutional baseline for effective assistance of counsel.”). 
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those rules might lead to better representation;”61 second, that Strick-
land was never meant to raise the bar of representation; and third, the 
dissent stressed that defense counsel must work within their limited 
budgets and cases which mandate that a per se new rule would only 
cause less effective representation.62 All these pronouncements reit-
erated that the Court felt that defendants should be happy with any 
representation they received and that the rights of defendants would 
be upheld within the budgetary constraints of the current system.  
What the dissenters failed to address, and of which the majority may 
have been keenly aware, is the fact that Strickland’s two-prong test 
had permitted such abysmal representation that it was hard to imag-
ine anything worse. 
The dissenters also failed to see that the problem with the criminal 
justice system may not be in the cost of defense, but rather in the cost 
of mass prosecution and detention.63  If mandates had been put on the 
criminal justice system that required particular performance, it is pos-
sible that our system would be less expensive because of fewer ap-
peals, post-trial motions, prison inmates, and less overall criminal case 
prosecution.64  The majority in Padilla may have been acutely aware 
of this possibility as well. 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla were touted as making a “signifi-
cant step forward” in reinvigorating Sixth Amendment claims.65  They 
sent a message to the criminal justice system and defense counsel that 
counsel’s performance in past decades had been deficient and change 
was coming. 
In Padilla, the Court made additional significant steps forward in 
reinvigorating Sixth Amendment claims.  First, the Court reinforced 
the importance of professional norms and standards when it again 
used them when analyzing the first prong of Strickland to determine 
whether or not the attorney’s conduct “fell below an objective stand-
ard of reasonableness.”66  Second, Padilla expanded lower federal and 
 
 61. Id. at 403 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 
481 (2000)). 
 62. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 63. One important point is that only approximately 3.5% of the total budget for 
the criminal justice system goes toward indigent defense compared to over 50% for 
police and prosecution.  See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN 
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 64 (1999). 
 64. Note that many states are now looking to counter the cost of their criminal 
justice systems due to budgetary constraints. See Nora V. Demleitner, Replacing In-
carceration: The Need for Dramatic Change, 22 FED. SENTENCING REP. 1, 1 (2009). 
 65. Blume & Neumann, supra note 17, at 164. 
 66. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
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state courts’ narrow definition of what advice was required under the 
Sixth Amendment by adding ramifications that were important to the 
defendant, even if his goals or objectives were not technically within 
the purview of the criminal court.67  Both of these steps further client 
representation because they move attorneys’ Sixth Amendment du-
ties closer to the rules that attorneys should follow under their profes-
sional standards.68 
The Padilla opinion was a triumph.  It took the collateral conse-
quence doctrine out of Sixth Amendment analysis and refocused the 
analysis on the defendant’s goals, a professional norm and standard.  
While the death penalty cases dealt with the mitigation of sentencing, 
the Padilla Court “expanded” counsel’s duty to advise under the Sixth 
Amendment to encompass consequences that traditionally had not 
been seen as criminal punishment, but were important to the defend-
ant.69  The fact that the Court has been increasingly using professional 
norms as a benchmark for reasonable representation creates hope 
that attorneys who are drunk, on drugs, or absent during trial may 
one day be considered to have violated the Sixth Amendment.70 
Padilla transformed four aspects of Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence and defense representation: first, it took the collateral conse-
quence doctrine out of the Sixth Amendment analysis;71 second, it 
reestablished the duty to work within the client’s objectives and goals 
in the attorney-client relationship regardless of whether the ultimate 
disposition takes place in criminal court;72 third, it further reinforced 
the importance of professional standards in determining Sixth 
 
 67. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (“[D]eportation is an in-
tegral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be 
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”). 
 68. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010) (stating that “a law-
yer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation”). 
 69. I placed the term expanded in quotation marks because the Court never ruled 
that collateral consequences were barred from Sixth Amendment analysis; therefore, 
while others felt the Court had expanded lawyers’ duty to their clients, the Court was 
clear that it had not. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“We, however, have never ap-
plied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”). 
 70. See Kirchmeier, supra note 54, at 455–63 (discussing cases where the attorney 
was asleep or mentally impaired); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in an Adversary 
System: The Persistent Question, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 652 (2006) (discussing the 
fact that Sixth Amendment violations have not been found when attorneys have been 
drunk, on drugs, asleep, parking their cars, et cetera). 
 71. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82. 
 72. See id. at 1483. 
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Amendment violations;73 and finally, it emphasized the importance of 
plea negotiations as a right under the Sixth Amendment.74 
While Padilla positively transformed several aspects of Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence, however, two issues remain problemati-
cally unresolved after Padilla.  First, Padilla created a two-tiered sys-
tem that does not distinctly delineate a bright line for courts and de-
fense counsel, leaving both unclear as to their mandate under 
Padilla.75  Second, while the Court clearly states that negotiation is 
part of the Sixth Amendment, its holding and the two-tiered system 
ultimately undermined its impact.76  Given the holding and its two-
tiered system, negotiation seems unnecessary to satisfactorily comply 
with the Sixth Amendment.  Finally, Padilla failed to address the se-
cond prong of Strickland, leaving the lower courts without guidance 
to determine the final outcome in a Sixth Amendment violation un-
der its holding.77 
The following section focuses on the issues above that may be det-
rimental to Padilla’s potential to bring about change in legal represen-
tation.  This discussion is significant because to find ways to better 
represent defendants in the criminal justice system, it is important to 
find the problematic areas and look for ways to address them. 
A. Padilla and Plea-Bargaining 
Criminal punishment has become a massive industry.78 The United 
States has the highest incarceration rate of any country as well as the 
greatest number of cases passing through its criminal justice system.79  
With crushing court dockets and massive caseloads, the goal of effi-
ciently processing and finalizing cases has become one of the most 
important goals of the criminal justice system.80  Prosecutors, courts, 
and defense attorneys find themselves focused on getting the docket 
 
 73. See id. at 1482. 
 74. See id. at 1486. 
 75. See id. at 1483. 
 76. See id. at 1486. 
 77. See id. at 1485 n.12.  This Article will not touch on prejudice as it has been 
discussed by other scholars.  For example, see Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, 
Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L. J. 693 (2011). 
 78. See William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the De-
cline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 379 (Carol S. 
Steiker ed., 2006). 
 79. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2010). 
 80. See Chin, supra note 51, at 678–81. 
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moving, sometimes in lieu of their other obligations within the crimi-
nal justice system.81  While historically criminal cases were disposed 
of by trial, the “American criminal justice system has been trans-
formed by plea bargaining.”82  Without it, the criminal justice system 
would cease to function.83 
In 2010, the crimes that most frequently led to removal were dan-
gerous drugs, immigration violations, and criminal traffic offenses.  
Combined, these crimes accounted for 62.3% of removals based on 
criminal convictions.84  Dangerous drug crimes include “manufactur-
ing, distribution, sale and possession of illegal drugs.”85  Immigration 
violations are defined as “entry and reentry, false claims to citizenship 
and alien smuggling.”86  Criminal traffic offenses are not defined.87 
In 2010, 83,941 cases were disposed of in the federal court system.88  
Out of the 83,941 cases, 81,217, or 96.8%, of the cases were disposed 
of by guilty pleas.89  In federal court, drug offenses constituted 25,042 
of all federal cases.90  Those convicted of trafficking pled guilty 96.4% 
of the time.91  Those convicted of simple possession pled guilty nine-
ty-eight percent of the time.92  Those convicted of communication fa-
cility, which refers to the use of a communication device such as a tel-
ephone during a drug trafficking offense, pled guilty 99.8% of the 
time.93  As for immigration violation cases, 28,504 cases were disposed 
 
 81.  See Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard!  The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and 
the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 919 (2004) (de-
scribing the Court’s holding as an interest in judicial economy). 
 82. Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 564, 564 (1977). 
 83. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 372 (1978) (Powell J., dissenting) 
(discussing the fact that plea-bargaining is “essential to the functioning of the crimi-
nal-justice system”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1984) (discussing the belief that without plea bargaining, the ju-
dicial system would come to a halt). 
 84. See 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 4, tbl. 4. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010, tbl. 5.34.2010 (2010), available at http://www. 
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5342010.pdf. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
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of in 2010, 28,321, or 99.4% of which, were disposed of with guilty 
pleas.94 
Immigration judges have lost their ability to provide relief in most 
instances in which a person is in deportation proceedings based upon 
a criminal conviction.  Once the conviction is handed down, the dam-
age is done.95  In most instances, therefore, the only avenue to ensure 
the potential for relief from deportation is during the criminal court 
proceeding.  It is only during the criminal proceeding that a defendant 
can avoid a conviction or plea to either a charge that does not carry 
immigration consequences or will allow for some form of relief in 
immigration court.  Since the vast majority of cases end with plea 
bargains, negotiation is crucial for a noncitizen defendant to have a 
chance to remain in the United States.  In Padilla, the majority recog-
nized that. 
Many scholars, commentators, and defense attorneys have rightly 
criticized the use of plea-bargaining.96  Most criticism stems from the 
belief that there is little “bargaining” between the prosecutor and the 
defendant or defense counsel.97  Plea bargaining had historically sup-
ported the supposition that as long as the outcome was accurate, de-
fense counsel was appointed, and the prosecutor did not tie a defend-
ant to a chair and make him sign the agreement, a violation would 
rarely occur.98 
In Padilla, however, the defendant’s knowledge prior to his plea 
was at the heart of the discussion, both in oral argument and in the ul-
timate opinion of the Court.99  Whether it was based upon voluntari-
ness, knowledge, fundamental fairness, or professional standards, the 
 
 94. See id.  Although one could argue that an immigration violation puts every-
one on notice and does not require any admonishment, the duty to advise and inves-
tigate is no less important.  For an example of an attorney who failed to investigate a 
client’s status, which led to the client’s deportation and fifty-seven months in federal 
custody despite the fact that he was a United States citizen, see Perez v. United 
States, 502 F. Supp. 2d 301 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 95. See Vázquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants, supra note 2, at 45. 
 96. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 
CALIF. L. REV. 652, 705 (1981) (describing plea-bargaining as coercive); Gerard E. 
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 
2129 (1998) (stating that the term “‘plea bargaining’ is something of a misnomer”).  
See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory Sys-
tem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988). 
 97. See generally Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:  
The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983).  
 98. See generally Cook, III, supra note 81. 
 99. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1483 (2010) (No. 08-651). 
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discussion focused on how much and what information the defendant 
needed to know before his plea could be accepted without violating 
the Constitution.100 
The Padilla majority opinion focused on three points to emphasize 
the importance of plea-bargaining during the criminal court process: 
(1) there is a Sixth Amendment duty to negotiate; (2) plea-bargaining 
is advantageous for the criminal justice system; and (3) even the most 
rudimentary understanding of immigration law can give counsel the 
ability to obtain a beneficial plea for her client.101 
Padilla declared that the Court had “long recognized that the nego-
tiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”102  It 
found that the “severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of banish-
ment or exile,’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to in-
form her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”103 
Padilla demonstrated the Court’s belief that plea-bargaining bene-
fits both the prosecutor and the defendant.104  The prosecutor can 
dispose of a case without going to trial and keep the wheels moving.  
The defendant gets a better deal that meets his goals, and, in cases 
where it is a concern, he may avoid deportation altogether.105  Con-
tinuing in that vein, the Court describes how the ability to bring de-
portation consequences into the conversation between the prosecutor 
and defense attorney would be advantageous to the plea-bargaining 
process and, therefore, would accomplish and satisfy the interests of 
both parties.106 
Finally, the Court further reinforces the importance and need for 
negotiation by stating that defense attorneys should have little excuse 
 
 100. See id. 
 101. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 102. Id. (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)). 
 103. Id. (citation omitted). 
 104. See id.; accord Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (discussing 
mutual advantage of plea bargaining). 
 105. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 
(1971) (citation omitted).  Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an 
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.  It leads to 
prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the cor-
rosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are de-
nied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are 
prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening 
the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilita-
tive prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. 
 106. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
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for not negotiating as part of their job function.  Justice Stevens states 
that defense counsel with even the “most rudimentary understand-
ing” should have the capability to negotiate a plea that would limit or 
prevent her client’s deportation,107 further emphasizing the Court’s 
acceptance of this function as a duty. 
One critique of the Padilla decision is that the opinion will fail to 
make a difference because prosecutors and the law will not allow de-
fendants to plea to a non-deportable offense; the increasingly hostile 
climate of immigration law leaves few crimes that do not require de-
portation.108  While it is true that the government may not agree to a 
plea that will keep an individual from being deported, defense coun-
sel is still obligated to negotiate the best plea for her client and to al-
low the client to make the choice between accepting the plea or going 
to trial.  As Justice Sotomayor noted during oral arguments, the de-
fendant may decide to risk jail, believing that staying in a United 
States jail is preferable to being sent to a country that he does not 
know.109 
Padilla’s ultimate holding did not expressly state that defense coun-
sel for noncitizen clients has an obligation to negotiate a plea that 
would prevent deportation.110  However, failure to engage in plea ne-
gotiations conflicts with the Court’s declaration that plea negotiation 
is part of the Sixth Amendment.  The next section further discusses 
the problem with the ability or duty to negotiate under the Padilla 
ruling. 
B. Padilla and Its Two-Tiered Admonishment Test 
The Supreme Court has been concerned for some time with the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction and counsel’s ad-
vice regarding those consequences during the criminal court proceed-
ings.  In 2001, in INS v. St. Cyr, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority 
that counsel that was competent but unaware of the discretionary re-
lief of 212(c) would “follow[] the advice of numerous practice guides” 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1393, 1399 (2011). 
 109. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) 
(No. 08-651) (“I do go to trial and I serve that longer sentence, but it’s here in the 
U.S. and not in my home country, where I might starve to death.  I think I’ll stay here 
and take that risk.”). 
 110. See Wright, supra note 51, at 1516. 
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to educate herself on the subject in order to assist defendants in pre-
serving eligibility for relief under the statute.111 
A decade later, this concern emanated throughout the courtroom 
during oral arguments in Padilla.  The most concise and insightful 
question on the predicament of this issue was made by Justice Alito.  
He hit the nail on the head when he directly inquired as to whether or 
not the Deputy Solicitor General wanted the Court to draw the dis-
tinction between giving advice to the defendant or just letting him fly 
in the wind.112 
JUSTICE ALITO: But what are you going to do in a situation 
where the defendant is concerned about removal . . . the client says: 
“Well, I’m also concerned about the immigration consequences.”  
And the lawyer says: “I’m not going to tell you . . . you’ve got to get 
an immigration lawyer.”  And the alien defendant says: “Well, I 
have no money; that’s why you were appointed to represent me.  
How am I going to get advice on the immigration law issue?”  And 
the lawyer says: “Well, that’s just too bad for you.”  And that’s the 
line you want us to draw?113 
A decade later, Justice Stevens was able to further articulate this 
belief by writing: 
The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of 
crimes has never been more important. . . .  [D]eportation is an inte-
gral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the pen-
alty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty 
to specified crimes.114 
And in the end, the Padilla Court simply stated, “we now hold that 
counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of de-
portation.”115  While the Court successfully created a Sixth Amend-
ment duty to advise as to the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction, it limited that duty.116  Where the immigration conse-
quences of a criminal conviction are “succinct, clear and explicit,” Pa-
dilla imposes on the defense attorney a duty to give specific advice as 
 
 111. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 & n.50 (2001); see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) 
(repealed 1996). 
 112. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(No. 08-651). 
 113. Id.  The irony is not lost on this author that Justice Alito’s concurrence held 
exactly what he seemed to be against during oral argument. 
 114. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (internal citation omitted). 
 115. Id. at 1486. 
 116. Id. at 1483. 
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to the immigration consequences (“Padilla duty”).117  However, 
“[w]hen the [relevant immigration] law is not succinct and straight-
forward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise 
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences.”118 
In implementing Padilla, this clarity determination will be critical 
because it will determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment duty.  
Defense counsel’s lack of understanding regarding when the Padilla 
duty is triggered will certainly jeopardize noncitizen defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights. Further, courts reviewing Padilla claims may 
themselves be ill-equipped to appropriately resolve the clarity inquiry 
that Padilla’s two-tiered advisement system requires.119 Yet, a nonciti-
zen defendant’s Sixth Amendment right will be completely dependent 
on their defense attorney’s assessment and/or a reviewing court’s de-
cision on this matter. 
Under Padilla, the advice that defense counsel must provide de-
pends on the type of criminal charge and its relationship to immigra-
tion law.  In those instances where Padilla would only require a ge-
neric advisement, criminal noncitizen defendants will be deprived of 
information and assistance to effectively combat removal from the 
United States but will be unable to bring a Sixth Amendment claim 
for relief.  If the relevant immigration law is not succinct, clear, and 
explicit, Padilla holds that simply telling a defendant that the criminal 
conviction may affect his immigration status is sufficient to satisfy the 
attorney’s Sixth Amendment duty. The need for defense counsel to 
advise a noncitizen defendant of the exact immigration consequences 
that he may face as a result of his plea or conviction seems no less im-
portant when immigration consequences are not succinct and straight-
forward.  Because of the two-tiered system created by Padilla, some 
noncitizen defendants will receive only a very generic, and often use-
less, warning. 
In addition, if the attorney is not required to give specific advice, it 
seems unlikely that the attorney will not be able to negotiate a plea 
for the noncitizen defendant that will assist in preventing his deporta-
tion.  This holding conflicts with the Court’s own declaration that it 
 
 117. Id. (emphasis added) (“But when the deportation consequence is truly clear . . 
. the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”).  
 118. Id. (emphasis added). 
 119. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, When State Courts Meet Padilla: 
A Concerted Effort is Needed to Bring State Courts Up to Speed on Crime-Based 
Immigration Law Provisions, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 299, 305 (2011). 
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has previously recognized that “[p]reserving the client’s right to re-
main in the United States may be more important to the client than 
any potential jail sentence,”120 as well as its assertion that it has “long 
recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of 
litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective as-
sistance of counsel.”121  This two-tiered admonishment system is also 
inconsistent with Justice Stevens’ reason for rejecting limiting the 
holding to affirmative misadvise: “it would deny a class of clients least 
able to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on depor-
tation . . . .”122 
It is a cause for concern that the scope of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel varies depending on the crimi-
nal charge and its perceived “clarity” in immigration law.  By excus-
ing defense attorneys from providing information about the immigra-
tion consequences of a conviction or plea to their noncitizen 
defendants when the law is not clear, Padilla will deprive certain 
noncitizen defendants of advice and performance that the Padilla 
Court itself recognized to be of paramount importance. 
1. Defense Attorneys and Distinguishing the Two-Tiered 
Requirement 
While giving a blanket duty to advise as to the possibility of ad-
verse immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, the Court, 
as usual, did not explain what counsel must do to fulfill that obliga-
tion.123  In articulating the manner in which counsel would be able to 
determine whether she needs to give specific advice or only inform 
the noncitizen defendant that the conviction may have immigration 
consequences, the Court went to the plain reading of the statute.124 
How defense attorneys are to determine whether implicated immi-
gration law is “succinct, clear, and explicit” is far from clear.  Mr. Pa-
dilla was charged with and convicted of a narcotics violation.125  In 
deciding Mr. Padilla’s Sixth Amendment claim, Justice Stevens recit-
ed the implicated immigration provision and then declared that “Pa-
 
 120. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001)). 
 121. Id. at 1486 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)). 
 122. Id. at 1484. 
 123. See Adam Liptak, Justices are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010) at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html 
?pagewanted=print (discussing the Roberts Court’s opinions which are long, but con-
sistently give little guidance to the lower courts). 
 124. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 125. See id. at 1477. 
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dilla’s counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make 
him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the stat-
ute,” because “[t]he consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be de-
termined from reading the removal statute . . . .”126  Justice Stevens 
did not provide further guidance as to how courts should decide 
whether the clarity of the implicated immigration law provision is 
“succinct, clear, and explicit” to impose a duty to give specific ad-
vice.127  Instead, the Court merely noted that there would “undoubt-
edly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences 
of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain” and imposed the more 
limited duty in those situations.128 
In the concurring opinion of Padilla, Justice Alito also discussed 
this problematic feature of the majority’s rule.  He characterized the 
majority approach as “problematic” for a number of reasons, but ob-
jected first that “it will not always be easy to tell whether a particular 
statutory provision is ‘succinct, clear, and explicit.’”129 He questioned 
how an attorney inexperienced in general immigration law could ever 
“be sure that a seemingly clear statutory provision actually means 
what it seems to say when read in isolation[.]”130  Like Justice Stevens, 
Justice Alito did not provide any other guidance because he deter-
mined that as a result of this confusion, defense counsel, if she knows 
her client is not a United States citizen, should only be obligated to 
say that the  
criminal conviction may have adverse consequences under the im-
migration laws and that the client should consult an immigration 
specialist if the client wants advice on that subject.  By putting the 
client on notice of the danger of removal, such advice would signifi-
cantly reduce the chance that the client would plead guilty under a 
mistaken premise.131 
 
 126. Id. at 1483 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006)) (“Any alien who at any 
time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt 
to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country re-
lating to a controlled substance . . . other than a single offense involving possession 
for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”)). 
 127. See id.; accord Liptak, supra note 123, at A1 (discussing the Roberts Court’s 
opinions that are long, but consistently give little guidance to the lower courts).  
 128. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 129. Id. at 1490 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1494. 
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2. Determining Which Admonishment Defense Counsel was 
Required to Follow Under Padilla 
Prior to Padilla, federal and state courts had many years of deter-
mining Sixth Amendment violations under Strickland. 
Now federal and state courts will have an extra layer to analyze be-
fore they can determine a Sixth Amendment violation under the 
Strickland test.  The lower federal and state courts reviewing Padilla 
claims are now burdened with the duty to determine whether the 
noncitizen defendant’s conviction was subject to immigration law that 
was “succinct, clear, and explicit.”  
In attempting to determine whether the immigration law is “suc-
cinct, clear, and explicit,” state courts have been left to flounder by 
themselves.  As a result, the outcomes have been inconsistent and 
problematic, leaving defendants less likely to win on a Sixth Amend-
ment violation claim under Padilla.132 
III.  IN THE AFTERMATH OF PADILLA: ENSURING THAT 
NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS WILL BE ADVISED OF IMMIGRATION 
CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
As David Cole has commented, “. . . despite the promise of ‘effec-
tive assistance’ set forth in Strickland, in actuality as long as the state 
provides a warm body with a law degree and a bar admission, little 
else matters.”133 In light of Padilla’s potential shortcomings, addition-
al measures will be needed to ensure that noncitizen defendants are 
advised of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.  
Fortifying the duty of defense counsel will be most important.  In 
thinking about how to reinforce the Padilla duty, however, it is im-
portant to consider how the responsibility for justice in the criminal 
system is typically allocated to defense counsel, the prosecution, and 
the court. Though the Padilla decision correctly assigned the duty to 
counsel the defendant on the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction to defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment, there 
should also be a duty for both the prosecutor and the court in making 
sure noncitizen defendants are informed of these consequences by 
their counsel. 
 
 132. See generally Hernández, supra note 119 (discussing the lower courts’ inabil-
ity to determine whether immigration law is succinct, clear, and explicit for a Padilla 
determination). 
 133. Cole, supra note 52, at 101–03. 
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A. Enforcing a Duty for Defense Counsel to Give Specific 
Advice Through Legislative Enactments and Ethical Rules 
The attorney-client relationship is the most important aspect of 
lawyering.  Without legal counsel, the accused could not hope to se-
cure his or her rights.134  The right to counsel is a fundamental right in 
a criminal proceeding and at the core of our criminal justice system.135  
The right to counsel also attaches to a guilty plea since it is a “critical” 
stage of the process.136  And as the Court held in Padilla, negotiation 
is part of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.137  Because “[c]ounsel’s concern is the faithful representation of 
the interest of [the] client,”138 regardless of a heavy caseload, it is de-
fense counsel’s responsibility to take the time necessary to provide ef-
fective representation.139 
The most fundamental way to ensure that noncitizens will be ad-
vised of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction is to 
require defense counsel to provide specific advice to each noncitizen 
client facing criminal conviction, instead of generic advice in some in-
stances.  The two-tiered advisement system under Padilla jeopardizes 
noncitizen defendants by basing counsel’s duty on the perceived 
complexity or clarity of the law instead of the duty to look to the 
goals of the client; leaving an uneducated, poor and foreign-born in-
dividual to his own devices.  This treatment runs afoul of the stand-
ards the legal profession purports to uphold. 
A review of existing professional responsibility rules demonstrate 
that defense counsel should provide all noncitizen defendants with 
specific advice regarding the immigration consequences of a criminal 
 
 134. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 135. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged 
with a crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in 
some countries, but it is in ours.”). 
 136. See Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968); White v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 59, 60 (1963).  
 137. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1474, 1486 (2010). 
 138. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268 (1973). 
The principal value of counsel to the accused in a criminal prosecution often 
does not lie in counsel’s ability to recite a list of possible defenses in the ab-
stract, nor in his ability, if time permitted, to amass a large quantum of fac-
tual data and inform the defendant of it . . . .  Often the interests of the ac-
cused are not advanced by challenges that would only delay the inevitable 
date of prosecution, or by contesting all guilt.  
Id. at 267–68 (citation omitted). 
 139. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 
YALE L.J. 1179, 1255 (1975). 
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conviction.140  A functional definition of an attorney provided by one 
set of professional standards outlines the central role that defense 
counsel must play in implementing the Padilla holding. 
The Standards for Criminal Justice already hold that the function 
of the defense attorney is to “serve as the accused’s counselor and ad-
vocate with courage and devotion and to render effective, quality rep-
resentation.”141  Further, to carry out that function, the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct explain that a lawyer should represent a cli-
ent “zealously” and “competently.”142  To properly perform zealously 
and competently, the attorney must communicate with and advise the 
client.143 
In 1999, the ABA added an additional subsection that specifically 
states that defense counsel should determine and advise the defend-
ant as to the possible collateral consequences of the contemplated 
plea.144 The rationale behind the addition was the ABA’s recognition 
that a separate standard was needed to address and recognize the re-
sponsibility of defense counsel in assessing collateral consequences 
for his client, due to the ever-increasing amount of proceedings that 
 
 140. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007) (“a lawyer shall abide by 
a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation”).  Padilla acknowl-
edged that the “weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that coun-
sel must advise her client regarding the risks of deportation.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 
1482; see also Vázquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants, supra note 2, at 58–59.  
 141. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DE-
FENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.2(b) (3d ed. 1993). 
 142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2010) (“As advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); Id. at 
R 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent rep-
resentation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reason-
ably necessary for the representation.”). 
 143. See id. at R 1.4. 
 144. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, standard 14-
3.2(f), at 116 (3d ed. 1999) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel should deter-
mine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to 
the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated 
plea.”), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
criminal_justice_standards/pleas_guilty.authcheckdam.pdf.  In a related subsection, 
the ABA also requires that,  
[c]ounsel should be provided in all proceedings arising from or connected 
with the initiation of a criminal action against the accused, including but not 
limited to extradition, mental competency, postconviction relief, and proba-
tion and parole revocation, regardless of the designation of the tribunal in 
which they occur or classification of the proceedings as civil in nature.  
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, standard 
5-5.2, at 64 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/publications/criminal_justice_standards/providing_defense_services.authcheckdam.p
df. 
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are considered “collateral.”145  The ABA specifically names immigra-
tion as a collateral consequence to be addressed.146  The ABA also 
expressly acknowledges that immigration consequences are at times a 
defendant’s greatest concern, creating a responsibility for defense 
counsel to investigate and advise on such matters.147  The ABA 
should enforce Padilla by providing separate rules specifically ad-
dressing immigration.148 
Existing professional rules clearly anticipate more robust advocacy 
efforts from defense counsel with respect to noncitizen defendants 
than Padilla’s advisement scheme would require. As one commenta-
tor stated, however, “The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal client 
to representation that satisfies at least a minimal standard of effec-
tiveness, to be assessed against an objective standard of reasonable-
ness.  Able, quality, and responsible representation, of course, meets 
standards far beyond constitutional minima.”149 
Jurisdictions should adopt stronger ethical rules, create legislative 
statutes, and then stringently enforce these professional standards to 
ensure that all citizens are advised as to the specific immigration con-
sequences of their pleas. 
The Sixth Amendment represents an evolving process and one that 
has been changing in incremental stages.150  With the foundation of 
 
 145. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, at 8 (3d ed. 2004), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_jus 
tice_section_newsletter/crimjust_standards_collateralsanctionwithcommentary.authc
heckdam.pdf (“The collateral consequences of conviction have been increasing stead-
ily in variety and severity for the past 20 years, and their lingering effects have be-
come increasingly difficult to shake off.  The dramatic increase in the numbers of per-
sons convicted and imprisoned means that this half-hidden network of legal barriers 
affects a growing proportion of the populace.”). 
 146. See id. at 16 & n.13 (“To the extent a non-citizen’s immigration status changes 
as a result of a criminal conviction, so that the offender becomes automatically de-
portable without opportunity for discretionary exception or revision, deportation too 
must be regarded as a ‘collateral sanction.’”). 
 147. See Flo Messier, Alien Defendants in Criminal Proceedings: Justice Shrugs, 36 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1416 (1999) (“Most aliens base their challenges on the claim 
that they received ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys failed to 
inform them of the immigration consequences of the criminal conviction.”). 
 148. This is not to say that the ABA should not address other consequences that 
the courts will still deem to be collateral.  However, immigration consequences 
should be separate since the Padilla decision specifically took it out of the collateral 
consequence definition. 
 149. Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the 
Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 329 (1997). 
 150. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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Padilla, an increasing body of professional standards and rules, and a 
continued shift towards client-centered representation, future Sixth 
Amendment litigation can only further advance the rights of the de-
fendant.  Padilla marks the continuation in a string of Sixth Amend-
ment cases, which may bring the Sixth Amendment to encompass the 
goals embodied in the rules of professional standards. 
B. Imposing a Duty for Prosecution to Inform Defendants of the 
Immigration Consequences of Their Pleas 
Prosecutors have often been considered to hold all the power.  In-
stead of the law ruling in our society, it is the prosecutors who rule.151  
In a time when criminal prosecutors, along with local police officers, 
are increasingly given the responsibility, duty and mission to assist 
with removing noncitizen defendants from this country during crimi-
nal proceedings, imposing a duty of transparency about the exercise 
of prosecutorial power is not unreasonable.152  A prosecutor’s ethical 
obligation to the criminal justice system is “to seek justice;” it is im-
portant that in the pursuit of justice, “justice is fairly done.” 153 
In the context of advising on the immigration consequences of a 
criminal conviction, a prosecutor’s “duty to seek justice” would be 
met by transparency of the relationship between the charges she 
elects to prosecute as well as the pleas she offers and the impact they 
will have on the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.  
In many cases, prosecutors have the information regarding the immi-
gration consequences of a criminal conviction readily available based 
upon their relationship with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation.  Thus, justice should require a sharing of that knowledge and 
information. 
A prosecutor has complete discretion when deciding whether to 
charge an individual with a crime and, if charged, whether to offer the 
 
 151. Stuntz, supra note 78, at 379. 
 152. See Enforcement & Removal, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT, http://www.ice.gov/# (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (including Criminal Alien Pro-
gram, Delegation of Immigration Authority 287(g), Rapid REPAT, and Secure 
Communities); Brown, supra note 108 (arguing that prosecutors are encouraged by 
DHS and have built-in incentives not to cooperate with defense attorneys). 
 153. Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, THE PROSECUTOR, May–Jun. 
2001, available at http://www.ndaa.org/ndaa/about/president_message_may_june_ 
2001.html. 
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individual a plea and under what terms.154  With such complete discre-
tion comes responsibility.155  Robert M.A. Johnson, former president 
of the National District Attorneys Association, has stated that prose-
cutors should understand all consequences that stem from a criminal 
conviction.156  Mr. Johnson’s position reflects that justice cannot be 
served if the prosecutor does not understand all the possible effects of 
the plea offer on the defendant because the plea must be proportion-
ate to the crime to serve justice; the effects of a plea offer include the 
immigration consequences of a conviction.157 
There may be times when the prosecutor does not know the immi-
gration status of a defendant and counsel may find it necessary to 
keep it confidential. By requiring the prosecutor to advise clients of 
the immigration consequences of a criminal charge or plea offer in 
every single case, the confidentiality of the defendant’s immigration 
status need not be breached. 
A system of transparency with regard to the immigration conse-
quences of pleas and criminal charges should be implemented as soon 
as possible.  The information regarding immigration consequences 
should be provided when an individual is charged with a crime, at dis-
covery, during plea negotiations, and at any other time when the de-
fendant can be advised of the ramifications of a charge or plea. 
C. Creating a Duty for the Court to Advise as to Immigration 
Consequences 
Under Federal Rule 11 of Criminal Procedure and many states’ 
Rule 11 of Criminal Procedure or statutes, courts are required to ad-
monish a defendant at the time of the plea to ensure that the plea is 
both knowing and voluntary.158  Despite their prior position that im-
migration consequences were “collateral,” many state legislatures 
added provisions in their Rule 11 or enacted specific statutes that re-
quire courts to admonish defendants that their plea may have adverse 
effects on their immigration status if they are noncitizens.159  Some 
 
 154. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 734–36 (2008). 
 155. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to 
Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 427–36 (2009). 
 156. See Johnson, supra note 153. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 159. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1j 
(2009); D.C. CODE § 16-713 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93 (2011); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 802E-2 (2008); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-8 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. 
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state-required admonishments even require courts to advise that a 
plea may have adverse effects, not only on a defendant’s immigration 
status, but also on his ability to naturalize.160  Currently, thirty states, 
the District of Columbia, and the United States military require such 
admonishments.161 
While these court admonishments may assist in ensuring that de-
fendants receive valuable information concerning the effects that a 
conviction might have on their immigration status, they should be 
used to supplement counsel’s advice rather than to substitute for such 
advice.162  Many court admonishments have been plagued with issues 
concerning their timeliness, accuracy and vagueness.  Typically, only a 
generic admonishment is given to every defendant who pleads guilty 
to a crime in that particular jurisdiction.163  Despite these failings, re-
quiring judges to admonish on immigration consequences may be 
beneficial and can be used responsibly to help guarantee that nonciti-
zen defendants are informed of the immigration consequences of a 
 
LAWS ch. 278, § 29D (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-210 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 29-1819.02 (2008); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50(7) (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1022 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2943.031 (West 2010); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 135.385 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-12-22 (2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 26.13 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6565(c) (2009); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.40.200 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 971.08 (2011); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 
11(c)(3)(C); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(f); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(8); IDAHO CRIM. R. 
11(d)(1); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.8(2)(b)(3); ME. R. CRIM. P. 11(h); MD. R. 4-242(e); 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3)(C); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01, 15.02; N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-
303(F)(5); see also D. COLO. CRIM. R. App. K §3(h), available at 
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Documents/LocalRules/LR_App_K.pdf (form guilty 
plea notification requiring acknowledgement of possible deportation); Ky. Plea Form 
AOC-491, at 2 ¶ 10 (Ver. 1.01, Rev. 2-03), available at http://courts.ky.gov/NR 
/rdonlyres/55E1F54E-ED5C-4A30-B1D5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/491.pdf; NJ Jud. Plea 
Form, N.J. Dir. 14-08, at 3 ¶ 17, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ 
forms/10079_main_plea_form.pdf (promulgated pursuant to N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3-9). 
 160. See, e.g., Slytman v. United States, 804 A.2d 1113, 1116-18 (D.C. 2002) (find-
ing trial court’s warning to noncitizen regarding immigration consequences, which 
omitted mention of exclusion and denial of naturalization, did not substantially com-
ply with the alien sentencing statute and defendant was permitted to withdraw his 
guilty plea). 
 161. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27–9, MILITARY JUDGES’ 
BENCHBOOK FOR TRIAL OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR: ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY 
PLEA, ch. 2, § II, para. 2-2-8 (2010); see also supra note 159. 
 162. See John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions:  Should this Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty 
Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 691, 714–20 (2003); Joanne Gottesman, Avoiding the 
“Secret Sentence”: A Model for Ensuring that New Jersey Criminal Defendants are 
Advised About Immigration Consequences Before Entering Guilty Pleas, 33 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 357, 385 (2009). 
 163. See Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Difference: Noncitizens and 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 751–52 (2001). 
2011] REALIZING PADILLA’S PROMISE 199 
 
guilty plea.  If the court is admonishing each and every defendant 
during bail, arraignment, indictment, and at the time of the plea, the 
importance of the subject may reverberate to defense counsel and ad-
vice by counsel will become a permanent and consistent result. 
D. Public Defender Organizations, the ABA, and Law Schools 
Some believe Padilla was the catalyst needed to make attorneys re-
assess their conduct and representation, resulting in a change to the 
benefit of clients.164  Many organizations, however, had already been 
advising on immigration and other consequences deemed to be col-
lateral when representing criminal defendants in the criminal court 
system,165 but since the Padilla decision, many more organizations 
have begun to take seriously Padilla’s mandate.  For example, the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has begun 
to put together trainings on the immigration consequences of criminal 
convictions through live streaming as well as CLE programs and vid-
eo trainings.166  The American Bar Association (ABA) has been 
awarded a grant from The National Institute of Justice to develop a 
website that will make information about the collateral consequences 
of a criminal conviction in each state available to attorneys across the 
country.167  An attorney will simply input the necessary information 
and a printout will be available which shows all the collateral conse-
quences applicable to a person pleading guilty in that state.168 
In addition, increasing educational opportunities for law students 
to learn about the intersection between immigration and criminal law 
would help to educate future prosecutors, defense attorneys, clerks, 
and judges on the issue before they enter the profession.169  Law 
school could create clinics that focus on representing clients in this 
area of law, giving law students practical experience while represent-
ing a class of individuals in drastic need of representation.  These ef-
 
 164. See Norman L. Reimer, Inside NACDL: The Padilla Decision:  Was 2010 the 
Year Marking a Paradigm Shift in the Role of Defense Counsel—Or Just More 
Business as Usual?, 34 CHAMPION 7 (2010). 
 165. See Wright, supra note 51 (discussing the different delivery models that de-
fense organizations and private defense attorneys are attempting to use to comply 
with the Padilla mandate). 
 166. Reimer, supra note 164, at 8. 
 167. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/ 
criminaljustice/CR206500/Pages/collateral.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2011). 
 168. Id.  
 169. See Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky?  
Thoughts on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 353, 
367 (2011). 
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forts would assist in increasing the number of attorneys with practical 
experience in the area as well as help alleviate the current dearth of 
lawyers knowledgeable on the subject.170 
CONCLUSION 
The consequences of criminal convictions affect immigration sta-
tus, the ability to naturalize, to remain out on bond pending criminal 
trial or hearing, and to negotiate a plea.  The most devastating im-
pact, however, is a noncitizen defendant’s ability to remain with fami-
ly, friends, and loved ones in a country that he calls “home.”  There-
fore, the importance of advice as to the immigration consequences of 
a criminal conviction as well as the ability to negotiate a plea that may 
prevent his deportation is immeasurable. 
Although Padilla is a landmark case and will help many noncitizen 
defendants get information about the immigration consequences of a 
criminal conviction, the opinion falls short of mandating that defense 
attorneys provide their noncitizen clients with the advice needed to 
prevent deportation in each and every case.  Courts, prosecutors, leg-
islatures, and advocates must assist in ensuring that defense counsel 
observe not only Padilla and the Sixth Amendment, but also their 
ethical and moral responsibility to their clients.  Accordingly, advo-
cates must continue to push for reform until all noncitizen defendants 
receive specific advice as to the immigration consequences of a crimi-
nal conviction. 
It may take years for the criminal justice system to incorporate Pa-
dilla.171  Further litigation will be necessary to provide a more robust 
Sixth Amendment duty.  If attorneys, advocates, and legislative bod-
ies, however, further reinforce and expand Padilla’s duty through leg-
islative mandates, increased professional standards, and overall grass-
roots implementation, future Sixth Amendment case law will 
continue to bring effective assistance of counsel within the standards 
that attorneys’ professional norms currently aspire to achieve. 
 
 
 170. See id. at 368. 
 171. See Wright, supra note 51, at 1536 (stating that it could take many months be-
fore criminal defense and immigration attorneys will be able to absorb Padilla’s deci-
sion and implications). 
